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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
LA MAR PEAY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PROVO 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRIGr, a body corpo- CASE 
rate and politic, and MERRILL CHRI~ NO. 9722 
TOPHERSON, RAY MURDOCK, SHIR-
LEY PAXMAN, WILFORD/ E. SMITH, 
and LA MAR EMPEY, Members of said 
Board, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Respondents' Petition for Rehearing 
and Brief on Petition for Rehearing 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendants and respondents respectfully petition this 
court for its order granting rehearing in the above entitled 
case. 
This petition is based upon the following points, where-
by it asserts the court has erred, hereinafter argued in the 
brief annexed hereto and made part of this petition: 
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Point 1: In arriving at its . decision, this court appar. 
ently gave no consideration to the rule of statutory con-
stuction that contemporaneous and official executive inter-
pretation is entitled to weight in judicial interpretation at 
a statute. 
Point ll: It would appear the construction placed up-
on section 11, Chapter 104, L. U. '61, limiting the vote to 
those electo~s who have paid a property tax in the preced-
ing year is a strained construction. 
Point m: If persoos voting in the election called pur-
suant to sectiO!ll 11, Chapter 104, L. U. '61, should have 
been restricted to qualified electocs who have paid a prop-
erty tax, then the court should have required a shoiWing 
tlbat sufficient invalid votes were cast to change the elec· 
tion results. 
Point IV: The proposition . voted upon was not alll· 
bigUotts;. but was tied directly to the statutory authority, 
incorporating the statute itself therein. 
Point V: It would appear there is no basis for the 
awarding ·of· oost:s against defendants and respondents. 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Respondents 
BRIEF ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Except to the eXtent attention is drawn thereto in the 
~·~ent, we believe the ·· facts require no further re-
statement. We pr~, therefore, to the argument on the 
pOintS asserted as error. 
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POINT I 
IN ARRIVING AT ITS DECISION, THIS COURT 
APPARENTLY GAVE NO CONSIDERATION TO THE 
RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THA'r CON-
TEMPORANEOUS AND OFFICIAL EXECUTIVE IN-
TERPRETATION IS ENTITLED TO WEIGHT IN JUDI-
CIAL INTERPRETATION OF A STATUTE. 
Section 53-7-12, U. C. A. '53, referred to by Section 11, 
Chapter 104, L. U. '61, for the procedure in which the lee-
way election should be called, was enacted originally as part 
of Section 2 (75-12-12), Chapter 80, L. U. 1947. It has 
remained uncllanged since its initial enactment. 
In his opinion No. 369, dated November 23, 1949, ad-"~ 
~ to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the 
Attorney General construed this statute as permitting au· 
qualified electors to vote at an election ·called thereunder, 
Biennial Report, Attorney General of Utah, Biennium ended 
June 30, 1950. That opinion states- in part: 
"While -this section provides that in submitting 
such a question to the electors 'the Board of Education 
shall . . . follow the procedure in elections for the is-
suance of bonds so far as applimble,' I have not been 
able to find any. provision setting forth any special 
qualification for voters participating in an el~on 
held pursuant to Section 75-12-12 [53-7-12, U CA. ;53]. 
I am of the opinion, therefore, that any qualified voter 
in the school district where such an ~lection is Qe-ing 
held is privileged to cast his or her vote regaXilless Qf 
whether or not he or she may have paid a -property 
tax." ' 
The· Legislature has met in general session six times 
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since this interpretation was given by the Attorney Gen-
eral. It has seen fit to make major changes in practically 
each such session in sohool financing legislation, but it has 
left the questioned statute unchanged. Presumably many 
Boards Q!f Education have availed themselves <Xf this stat-
ute.~ gnq pre~umably they have relied upon the intepreta-
tion thus given in calling such elections. 
We are nort unmindful that courts are not necessarily 
bound by executive or administrative interpretation of stat-
utes. HO!We·ver, ·this court has given weight to such inter· 
pretation when sueh interpretation has been of long stand· 
ing an.d rights and duties have accrued thereunder. State 
v. Alta Club, 120 Utah 121, 232 P. 2d 759, State v. Hatch, 
9 Utah 2.d 288, 342 p, 2d 1103, in re Cowan's Est.are, 98 
Utah 393, 99 P. 2d. 605·, Southwestern Explo:ration Co. v. 
County of Orange, 283 P. 2d 25·"ll 44 Oal. 2d 549, Mountain 
View Union High School v. City Council, 335 P. 2d. 957, 168 
C. A .. 2d 8R See also 2 Sutherland, S~tutory Construction, 
(3d Ed), Sec.'s 5101 and following: 
In its opinion this court states, in discussing the ques-
tion of legislative intent: 
"In this connection it is legitimate to take cog-
nizance of legislative policy as demonstrated in the 
clQsely analogous s.ituations involving the incurring of 
indebtedness by school districts dealt with in Chapter 
10 of Title 53.- ... '' (Emphasis added). 
We- respectfully assert that this statement does not ac-
curately represent the facts. First, the respective sit~a­
tiOils ··are not necessarily closely analogous. The mcurnng 
of indebtedness fixes fiscal obligations :for future years with· 
out regard to subsequent changes in administration or needs. 
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The "leeway, proposition is merely permissive, allowing 
Boards of Education greater resources, from year to year, 
depending on Board policy, in operating revenue available. 
More important, the property tax qualification for voting on 
incurri:ng of indebtedness is NOT a ,matter of legislative 
pollcy; it is a matter of constitutional mandate, set :f:brtlh 
in Article XIV, Section 3, Utah Constitution. No such con-
stitutional mandate exists as regards special taxes. Article 
I, Section 4, and Article IV, Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
See also Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of 
the Convention to Adopt a Constitution for the State of 
Utah, pages 231-233, 778-783, and 1142. 
We respectfully state that no legislative policy is dis-
cernable in Utah on such questions. Section 26-14-10, U. 
C. A. '53 provides that the board of trustees of a Mosquito 
Abatement District may call an election to submit the ques-
tion of additional tax levy, submitting the proposition "to 
the electors of the district," without regard to property 
qualifications. Petitions to annex additional area must be 
signed by owners of more than half the assessed valuation 
of the proposed annexation, but upon such petition, the 
proposition is submitted "to the electors of the district'' 
without regard to p~perty qualification. 26-14-12, U. C. A .. 
'53. 
Only electors who shall have paid a property tax are 
qualified to vote on propositions involved in a Cemetery 
Maintenance District, 8-1-5 U. C. A. '53. No vote at all is 
provided as a condition of creating a Water Conservancy 
District. Chapter 9, Title 73, U. C. A. '53. Borth may fix 
tax levies. 
The creation of a Metropolitan Water Di.stli-ct is by 
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vote of all electors residing within the proposed district 
wifuout regard to property qualif1cations. 73-8-8 u. c.~ 
'53. Yet Metropolitan Water Districts have the levy fix-
ing power. 
The statute authorizing Fire Protection Districts, which 
may fix tax levies, states ". . . Qualified electors, under 
the general laws of the state, living within such district 
shall be entitled to vote on the question of whether the 
distict shall or shall . not be created." 17-9-5 U. C. A. '53. 
Our search has not been exhaustive. The foregoing is 
submitted merely to illustrate the absence of any fixed leg-
islative policy which may be used as a basis for interpreting 
section 53-7-12, U. C. A. '53. 
POINT II 
IT W 0 U L D APPEAR THE CONSTRUCTION 
PLACED UPON SECTION 11, CHAPrER 104, L. U. '61, 
LIMITING THE VOTE TO THOSE ELECTORS WHO 
HAVE PAID A PROPERTY TAX IN THE PRECEDING 
YEAR IS A STRAINED CONISTRUCTION. 
That section is permissive, allowing a board of educa-
tion to raise additional operating revenue fort the school 
system, should it choose, "with the consent of a majority 
of the electors of the distr1ct," NOT "with the consent of 
a majority of the electors of the district who shall have 
paid property tax in such district in the year next preced· 
ing such election." 
The remainder of that section dealing with the ob-
taining -of such consent is concerned with procedure, not 
with the substantive qualification of electors. The statute 
merely says such election shall be "held . . . in the man-
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ner set forth in Section 53-2(7)-12, Utah Code Annotated 
1953." That is, the mechanics of the call, setting up, and 
conducting the election is as therein provided. 
That section, in twn, states that "the board of educa-
tion shall give such reasonable n()tice of such submission as 
it may deem proper, and shall follow the procedUre in elec-
tions for the issuance ·of bonds so far as applicable." (Em-
phasis added). -~Here again, the legislature is talking of the 
mechanics of the election, not substantive qualification of 
electors. 
...·· ... 
The opinion of the Court, relying upon section 53:10-
11, U. C. A. '53, dealing with qualifications of voters on an 
election to create indebtedness, states that rthe interpretation 
urged would render part of that_ section moperative. . We , 
submit that such is precisely the function of the phrase · · 
.. so far as applicable" in section 53-7-12 U. C. A. '53. "• The ... 
construction placed by the court rend~rs the pliTase ·'so far . 
as applicable' entirely meaningless. We respectfully urge 
that the court has, in con~truing the several )statutes, con-
fused first, the question of qualification of electors and ,the · 
mechanics af cOnducting the election, and second, the. mat-
ter of an election for a special tax~ wherein the legisla~ -. 
may or may not require a. property qualification O!f th~ 
elector, and the matter of an election. for .the purpose of· 
inrurring indebtedness; wherein the legislature has no pr~·: 
rogative. .. .. 
In an inStances we have ·found where we believe the.'' 
legislature intended to inipose the 'property qualification on · 
electors, it has expressly so -stated. Here the _court has 
read the limitation into- the act by implication. We believ~,: 
the law should .. be that no construction. of an election_la~,: 
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should be indulged in which would disfranchise any voter 
if the law is reasonably susceptible to any other meaning: 
Patterson v. Justus, 173 Kan. 207, 245 P. 2d 968. Indeed 
this court went far along the trail of this rule in Rothf~ 
v. Southworth, 11 Utah 2d 169, 356 P. 2d 612, when it per-
mitted those whom many might consider transients to help 
choose state and local officers who in turn exercise pow. 
ers of the, sovereign fax greater than that of fixing a limi-
ted mill levy. We respectfully 1but firmly assert that the 
decision of this case reverses that direction with a ven-
geance. 
POINT m 
IF PERSONS VOTING IN THE ELECTION CALLED 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 11, CHAPI'ER 104, L. U. '61, 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO QUALIFIED 
ELECTORS WHO HAD PAID PROPERTY TAX, THEN 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE REQUIRED A SHOWING 
THAT SUFFICIENT INVALID VOTES WERE CAST TO 
CHANGE THE ELECTION RESULT. 
The pleadings show that this is an election contest. 
The complaint expressly so states. The answer denied spe-
cifically that unqualified voters cast ballots or, in the al-
ternative, that if any did, they . were not sufficient in num· 
ber to alter the results. As far as we know, or as far as 
the record shows, no elector who had not paid a property 
tax in the district in the year preceding the election cast 
a ballot in the election here contested. 
The decision of this court merely states that the act 
"requires property taxpayer qualification , for voting at the 
election provided therein." Perhaps this requirement was 
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met Certainly the burden of showing otherwise rests upon 
plaintiff. 
Section 20.15-1 U.C.A. '53, as far as appliCaJble, states: 
uThe election . . . to deteJ.mine any proposition 
submitted to a vote of the people, may be contested: 
( 4) When illegal votes have been received, or legal 
votes have been rejected, at the polls sufficient to 
change the result . 
. . . . " (Emphasis added) 
This point was argued before the trial judge, but, in 
view of his construction of the ·statute, this was considered 
immaterial. We urged this position on argument before 
this court. We do not believe the dedsion answers this 
question, or, if it does, tt reverses a position previously ta-
ken. 
Whitmore v. Carbon County, 36 Utah 394, 104 Pac. 
222, concerned a writ of prohibition to restrain the issuance 
of bonds pursuant to an election. The resolution stating 
'1hat the question of the issuance of such bonds be sub-
mitted to the qualified electors of said Carbon County at 
a special election which is hereby called for that purpose." 
The notice of election did not specify limitation on electors 
voting, though it stated that the election was called and 
would be held "as provided by law." 
This court, in denying the writ, stated: 
"It is alleged in the answer to the petition for the 
writ, and it is admitted by the petitioner, that only 
such qualified voters as had paid a property tax in the 
<nmty in the year 1908 were permitted to vote, and 
only such voted at the election. 
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... It is now contended .by the petitioner that the 
election is void because the notices did not specify the 
particular qualifications whkh entitled the electors to 
vote. And it is especially contended thaf the· notices 
were insuffi~i~n~. be!Cause tpey did.nOit contain the state. 
men~ oc specificatiqn,. _in sub~tanpe_ or effect, that none 
but qualified voters who had paid a property 1;<qc in 
the cormty in the year .1908, or in tlle. year. next pre-
ceding the.· el~tion, were entitled to vOte. ·The statute 
· · - itself prescribes the qualificatiOIIlS of such el~tocs. It 
was not essential to set them forth in the nortice. (Cases 
cited) The function and purpose of the notice is not 
.to noti.ty ,the public and taxpayers what the law is1 but 
·to nqtify~ ther.n .. 9f. the ~proposed action to be taken, and 
of the time and place when and whe~ tbe consent of 
. thos.~ entitled by 1~'":', to giye or .. hoJditmay be''obtruned. 
·we d~ not see any 'meTit to the contention." . 
The same position was again taken by this court in 
Van Orden y. Boar~ of Education, 56 Utah 4~0, 191 Pac. 
230. 
We again draw the COUI"t's attentio~ that ~ndents 
have never admitted in the case at bar that non-taxpayirtg . 
electors voted in the. contested election .. we have, in the 
aiternati~e, pleaded that . if such be the ,Ca.se, i~liffictent 
such votes were cast to alter th~ results. We assert that 
on the authority orf this court, and should it adhe~e· to its ' 
position that the statutes h~re. involyed restrict voters at 
"leeway" elections to those who. have paid a property tax, 
the appellant still must show that sufficient vOtes were cast 
by unqualified electors; to change· the results. 
·. Not only is this poirit naturally of concern to defend· 
ants and res:~IJ.d.~~'· but it s~ouid. be imperative that other 
boards of education have a clear answer.· · 
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U the absence from the notice calling such election 
of the statement that only electors who have paid a prop-
erty tax in the district in the preceding year may vote voids 
the election, and if that alone voids it, then boards of edu-
cation thl'oughout the state should be made aware thereof, 
as should boards of county commissioners, who actually fix 
the levy annually. The authority granted by "leeway" elec-
tions is a continuing one, several boards of education have 
called such elections in years passed, and assert authority 
under the results thereof which they may well not have un-
der such an interpretation. 
If the interpretation is in fact otherwise, then we are 
at a loss to understand how the election in question is voided 
on this point. Olson v. Fleming, 254 P. 2d 335, 174 Kan. 
177. See also Sacramento County v. Stephens, 53 P2d 197, 
11 Cal. App 2d 110. 
POINT IV 
THE PROPOSITION VOTED UPON WAS NOT AM-
BIGUOUS, BUT WAS TIED DIRECTLY TO THE STAT-
UTORY AUTHORITY, INCORPORATING THE STAT-
UTE ITSELF THEREIN. 
In holding our position on the qualification of electors 
tmtenable, the decision of this court states that we would 
thereby give effect to a part of the statute and ignore oth-
ers. We respectfully but strenuously urge that in holding 
the proposition placed upon the ballot void for ambiguity, 
this court does exactly the same thing. It would appear 
to completely ignore the phrase "as provided in Section 11, 
Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961," and the further phrase 
"as provided by law." 
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The only legislative authority by way of leeway elec-
tions is that contained in the last sentence of the first para-
graph of section 11: 
"Said voted leeway program shall· not exceed an 
amonnt equal to 20% of the basic program of the dis-
trict." (Emphasis addd) 
The "State-supported minimum program' or "minimum 
school program" as defined in sub-section (a) of Section 3 , 
Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961, is defined as including 
many matters not the conce,rn of the local districts. The 
proposition upon whieh the electors voted does NOT use the 
phrases ''state" supported minimum program'' 0[' ''minimum 
school program." It poses the question whetheT the board 
may ''maintain a 'voted leeway' program as provided in Sec-
tion 11, Laws of Utah 1961, nOit to ~ceed ten per cent 
(10%) of the minimum basic program prorvided by law." 
(Emphasis added). 
Admittedly, the use of the word 'minimum' was un-
fortunate, but we fail to see wherein that word would mis-
lead a vote. It should be understood that we deem the en-
tire legislative arrangement for school financing unduly 
intricate, complex and far from a model of legal draftsman-
ship. We challenge anyone to draft a proposition for a 'lee-
way' election that is simple and lucid. We submit that the 
simplest form to submit the proposition is by express refer-
ence to the statute itself, and this is what was done. 
An analogous problem was presented to the supreme 
court of Kansas in the case of Gray v. Joint Rural High 
School District, 286 P. 2d 147, 178 Kan. 387. Thls was a 
consolidated action to enjoin two boards~ education from 
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t.ssuing bonds to construct a joint high school, pursuant to 
an election held in the two districts. Most issues therein 
discussed are not material here. The court refused the 
injunction. 
One of the grounds urged for the injunction was that 
the proposition placed on the ballot was ambiguous and un-
certain. The proposition thus stated on the ballot was 
whether the district could issue its bonds "not to exceed" a 
given figure. In each instance the figure stated in the 
proposition, if bonds were issued therefore, would cause that 
disbict to exceed its statutory debt limitation. 
The court stated: 
"It is to be noted further that the proposals were 
to vote bonds in an amount no.t to exceed (sic) a stated 
amount. Any contention that the exact amount of 
txmds to be issued was not stated and therefore the 
elections were illegal cannot be sustained. At the time 
of the elections there was nothing to indicate the full 
amount would not be issued and sold. In Pittsburg 
Board of Education vs. Davis 120 Kan. 768, 245 P. 
112, it was held that the fact that the statutes prohibi-
ted the issuance of bonds in e~cess of the amount 
named does not prohibit voting for more than that 
amotmt In that opinion cases in support are· reviewed. 
In an analogous case this court, considering a propo-
sition submitted wherein bonds 'not exceeding' a stated 
sum were voted upon,. held that 'this slight departure 
from the precision of statement required by the statute,' 
did not render the proposed issue illegal." (Cases cited) 
The court further states: 
"There was nothing miSleading fore the reasons ~e · 
electors knew at all times they could not exceed the 
statutory seven per cent limitation, and they were ad-
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viSed· by. the question submitted that the total cost 
stated _was not a finality, but only an estimated cost." 
The coUrt of course pointed out that the districts could 
not issue bonds exceeding the seven per cent debt limita-
tion, _but' .. that question_ was not befure the coUrt. 
To. th~ ·~on ~t the proposition on the ballot was 
vodd and._anrbi~ous beca~ of the 1-ge used, the court 
states: 
· "We- have not overlooked the- criticism of appel· 
!ants that the statute, 72-507, states that tJhe ·COQPel'·,. 
ating school boards shall detennine and agree upon the 
total estimated cost of the joint building .,and· the 
:•,: amotintt<rbe-b:n:n by'each Of the uniting districts,' while 
· the- concluding part- of -the question submitted states 
the bOnds: -of ·District 9 shall not be issued unless Dis· 
tricrt 30 shall-authorize- $122,000 of bonds to pay its 
share- of the -cost (sic). Appellants seem to ·conterui 
the voters were misled ·because of the use of the word 
'share"- -instead of the word 'amount'. Assuming the 
word 'share' should not have been su!bstituted, we do 
noit 'think anyone was confused in the slightest because 
it ·was." 
Els~here; ···in dis~ussing the fact that the amount of 
the bonds authorized exceeded the debt liprlt, and the ef· 
feet thereof on ·the fact that each district's election was 
tied tQ the other, the court states:. 
"Nor do· we think the voters had any cause to 
believe that regardless of -~he amount 9f bonds ~trict 
9 might issue, District 30 had no choice hut to issue 
- bonds in the amount o!f $122,000. They must be pre-
. sumed·-to knoi\v that .the electors of that distriq were 
under -the same statutory authorio/ and: restri~?ES as 
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they were, and this appears in the question submitted 
where those statutes are specifically mentioned. In our 
opinion, the proposition and question submitted were 
substantially in accord with the statute and the voters 
were not misled.'' 
In the case at bar, the respondents sought authority 
from the electors, not to incur a specific debt for a specific 
capital improvement, but to maintain operations at a con-
tinuing higher level than they could otherwise. What bet-
ter way is there to define the authority sought than to re-
fer specifically to the statute under whilch the authority is 
sought? The Kansas court sees this as sufficient. Nor 
did it find that the voters were misled because the propo-
sition submitted used the word 'share' instead of 'amount'. 
Nor do we believe it can be asserted or inferred that 
the electors in the election here contested were misled. What 
was sought was one half the maximum authority obtainable 
under the provisions of Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws orf 
Utah 1961. The proposition states exactly that, with the 
further proviso, "as provided by law". Certainly no one 
asserts that the Board would or possibly could acquire more 
authority than that through a leeway election. 
The cases of Whitmore v. Carbon County, 36 Utah 394, 
104 Pac. 222, and Van Orden v. Board of Education, 56 Utah 
430, 191 Pac. 230, cited elsewhere herein on the question 
of qualifications of electors, present an analogy we believe 
valid. We paraphrase by stating that the function and pur-
pose of the proposition is not to notify the public and>the 
taxpayers what the law is, but to notify them of·-th~ ·pro-
posed action to be taken. . . . 
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POINT V 
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE IS NO BASIS 
FOR THE AWARDING OF COSTS AG!AINST DEFEND. 
ANTS AND RESP01NDENTS. 
This action was brought against the Board ~ Educa-
tion of Provo City School District and the members of the 
board, as such members. We take respondents to be an 
agency of the State of Utah. 
Rule 54 (d) (1) U. R. C. P. provides: 
". . . . Costs against the State o!f Utah, its Olffi. 
cers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law." 
We bclieve this to have always been the law. We find 
no statute upon which the award herein made is based. 
Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 P. 2d 393. 
The only statute we find which by the greatest stretch 
of imagination could be held to authorize award of costs 
is Chapter 15 of Title 20, U. C. A. '53. We state that this 
does nort apply, as provisions theTein go only to the ques-
tion of election contests as between candidates. Moreover, 
though the pleadings are framed as an election contest, this 
court apparently does not so consider the case. 
If we are in error in this conclusion, then section 20· 
15-1, U. C. A. 53, quoted under Point ill herein, would liP' 
ply, and this court should have remanded the case for a 
determination whether illegal votes cast would change the 
result. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wl' are informed that some nine Boards of Education, 
administering school districts with a total school popula-
tion representing a substantial majority of that in the State,, 
are operating under authority granted by "leeway" elec-
tions. We are further informed that in none of the elec-
tions we1·e property qualifications required, at least in tlhe 
notices calling such elections. Apparently their counsel 
1·ead the statutes as we do. The Attorney Gene~al so read 
the statutes, as did the trial court. 'rhis court is the first 
official body to give the construction in the decision. 
The proposition voted upon in Provo City School Dis-
trict was debated long and loud in the community, ·in pub-
llc meetings and in the press. Counsel for appellant par-
ticipated therein. No question as to the interpretation of 
the statute or meaning of the proposition as phrased in the 
notice calling the election was raised by anyone. Debate 
was on the merits of the proposed authority sought by the 
board. No one claimed to be misled. A substantial ma-
jority of voters indicated a desire for an enlarged school 
program. There is no showing that unqualified electors 
voted, regardless of the qualification imposed. It does not 
lie now y,ith appellant to question action of the electorate. 
We believe the court should reverse the electorate only on 
most compelling grounds. The grounds stated in the opin-
ion are, we submit, not compelling. 
Another matter of grave concern arises, in view of the 
provisions of sections 59-11-11 U. C. A. '53, and 59-10-14, 
U. C. A. '53, and the cases decided by this court thereunder .. 
Although the applicability of these sections to the problem 
at hand cannot be determined in this case, the possibilities 
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in a later case on facts of which we may not now be aware, 
could be catastrophic to school districts not presently ,00. 
fore the eourt. The decision herein, we suggest, might open 
a plethora of litigation. 
We re!Spectfully request that the petition for rehearing 
be granted, and that upon hearing thereon, this court af. 
firm the trial court. 
Respectfully sUJbmitted, 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Attorney for Respondents 
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